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The utilization of procedural default by reviewing courts has placed an
immense burden on Virginia capital defense attorneys to recognize trial
errors and correctly preserve the record in preparation for appellate review
and habeas corpus proceedings. Making the record and preserving issues are
second nature for most trial lawyers. Even so, in a capital case more than
in any other case, it is imperative that defense counsel perform this duty in
a comprehensive and effective manner. Loss of any appealable issue can
mean the difference between a client living or dying.
This article will provide defense counsel the fundamentals for making
the record and preserving appellate and habeas issues. In addition, creative
ideas for making the record and preserving error will be presented. The
article will begin by addressing the methodology, designed by the Virginia
legislature and judiciary and implemented by the Supreme Court of Virginia
and the federal courts, which frequently results in the default or waiver of
colorable claims in Virginia capital cases.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Skidmore College.
1. This is the fifth article dealing with the preservation of an appellate-friendly record
and valid daims to be published in the twelve year history of the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse journal. The Reader may fairly ask why such a topic, seemingly so straight
forward, appreciated, and followed by practitioners across the state receives such repeated
treatment? The answer is simply that Virginia capital defendants are still being executed at
an alarming rate due to the application of a two-word phrase: procedural default. This article
is an attempt to provide capital defense counsel a foundation with which they may proceed
effectively in defending their clients during trial while still enabling a client who receives a
death sentence to attack the sentence with valid, bona fide appellate and habeas claims. See
Carey L. Cooper, The Never Ending Story: Combating Procedural Bars in Capital Cases, CAP.
DEF. J., Spring 1997, at 38; Kristopher E. Ahrend, Beating a Potential Deathtrap: How to
Preserve the Appellate Recordfor Federal Review andAvoid Virginia's Procedural Default, CAP.
DEF. DIG., Spring 1995, at 34; Michael A. Groot, To Attain the Ends oflustice: Confronting
Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases, CAP. DEF. DIG., Spring 1994, at 44; Robert L.
Powley, Perfecting the Record ofa Capital Case in Virginia, CAP. DEF. DIG., Fall 1990, at 26.
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In order to understand how to best "make the record" and preserve
issues, an understanding of what barriers the capital defense attorney faces
will be instructive. Some of the procedural requirements with which an
attorney must comply are defined by the Rules of the Virginia Supreme
Court. In addition, case law from the United States Supreme Court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court
of Virginia and the Virginia Court of Appeals have added nuances and
further hurdles which allow these and other courts to avoid entertaining
valid claims of error through the mechanisms of default and waiver. In
order to know what must be done during trial and in preparation for appeal
and habeas proceedings, a defense attorney must fully understand the
procedural bars now in effect.
II. Virginia and Federal Court Default Methodology
Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court2 is the basis most
commonly relied upon by the Supreme Court of Virginia to hold that an
issue has been procedurally defaulted. Rule 5:25 reads:
Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the com-
mission before which the case was initially tried unless the objection was
stated with reasonable certainty at the time oftbe ruling, except for good
cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.3
In Kercher's Administrator v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad
Co.4 the Supreme Court of Appeals, now the Supreme Court of Virginia,
stated that Rule XXII, the predecessor to Rule 5:25, was adopted not to
obstruct petitioners, "but to make more certain the attainment of the ends
of justice."' Instead, the reality is that this rule, also known as the "contem-
poraneous objection rule," has been used to prevent valid claims and trial
errors from being heard on appeal in state and federal courts, even in capital
cases.
6
In Wainurigbt v. Sykes' the United States Supreme Court held that a
claim of error which a state court ruled procedurally defaulted in accordance
with a state rule, such as the contemporaneous objection rule, will also be
considered procedurally defaulted in federal habeas proceedings.' Rule 5:25
2. VA. S. CT. R. 5:25. Rule 5A:18 of the Rules of the Virginia Court of Appeals is
essentially identical to Rule 5:25 in application.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. 142 S.E. 393 (Va. 1928).
5. Kercher's Adm'r v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 142 S.E. 393, 395
(Va. 1928).
6. See Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. 807, 815 (E.D. Va. 1984).
7. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
8. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85 (1977). According to Wainwright, a state
court finding that the issue is procedurally defaulted will bar federal review of the claim
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sets the foundation for procedural default in Virginia capital cases. What
follows are some of the specific ways in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia and federal courts use this rule to hold that an issue raised by a
convicted capital defendant is defaulted in post-conviction proceedings.
A. Failure to Object in a Contemporaneous Manner at Trial
The Supreme Court of Virginia will hold a claim defaulted if defense
counsel failed to object to the error at the time that the error occurred at
trial." This is the "contemporaneous objection rule" cited above.'" The
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that timely objection is imperative in
order for "the trial judge [to] be informed of the precise points of objection
in the minds of counsel so that he may rule intelligently, thereby avoiding
delay and the expense incident to appeal[ ]. . .."" It is important to note
that trial counsel must require the judge to rule on any objection brought
before the court at the time of the objection or motion hearing. 2
Beavers v. Commonwealth," an often cited Virginia case, demonstrates
the strict requirements of timely objection. In Beavers defense counsel
moved, after the jury was seated, to strike the jury panel based on the
dismissal for cause of three Venire members who expressed opposition to the
death penalty. 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the error would
have been reviewable had counsel correctly preserved it.'" Preservation of
the error would have required two objections per juror, one objection at the
"absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Id. at 84. For an analysis of a proper
cause and prejudice showing, which is difficult to prove, see Groot, supra note 1, at 46.
9. See Briley, 584 F. Supp. at 815.
10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
11. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 175 S.E.2d 285, 288 (Va. 1970) (quoting Harlow v.
Commonwealth, 77 S.E.2d 851, 854 (Va. 1953)).
12. See Stephen B. Bright, Preserving Error at Capital Trials, CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at
43. This article takes much of its direction and owes much of its credit to Mr. Bright's article.
Stephen B. Bright is Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta, Georgia.
Several Virginia cases state that the purpose of Rule 5:25 is to provide the trial judge the
ability to rule intelligently on an objection. See Reil v. Commonwealth, 171 S.E.2d 162, 164
(Va. 1969) (citing to then Rule 1:8 requiring that the trial judge be informed of the precise
points of objection in the minds of counsel so that he may rule intelligently on such objec-
tion); Williamson v. Commonwealth, 175 S.E.2d 285, 288 (Va. 1970) (same). An un-ruled
upon objection suggests failure to comply with Rule 5:25, and may lead to a finding of
procedural default. Therefore, when a trial judge fails to rule on an objection, either due to
that judge's attempt to attain acquiescence, compromise, or simply to deny future appellate
review, such failure will likely deny appellate review for that error. See Bright, supra this
note, at 46; seealso Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680,682 (Va. 1974); infra notes 105-10 and
accompanying text.
13. 427 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993).
14. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 411, 418-19 (Va. 1993).
15. Id.; see also Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 793 (Va. 1989).
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time of the dismissal of each juror, and a second objection before the jury
was seated.'6 Holdings of this kind require that capital defense counsel pay
dose attention to detail in order to object effectively at trial.
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth," which resulted in a new sentencing
proceeding for the defendant, demonstrates the correct method, through
timely and numerous objections, of making the record and preserving an
issue for appeal.'" Yarbrough was the first person sentenced to death based
solely on the statutory aggravating factor of vileness since Virginia instituted
parole ineligibility for convicted capital murderers.' 9 Defense counsel
requested a "life means life" instruction at four different points during trial
and post-trial: first when proffering jury instructions, next at the end of the
Commonwealth's closing, again when the jury sent a question to the trial
court during its deliberations, specifically asking for a definition of life in
prison, and finally at the post-trial sentencing when the judge imposed the
jury's death recommendation.' Because of defense counsel's diligence in
proffering the instruction at each relevant step of the proceedings and object-
ing to the court's failure to provide the instruction, the reviewing court was
unable to declare the issue procedurally defaulted.2' Yarbrough's death
sentence was vacated and his case was remanded for a new sentencing
proceeding.Y Had defense counsel failed at any of the four points to raise
the issue, the Commonwealth could have been able to argue, and the re-
viewing court to rule, that the issue had been procedurally defaulted.
Due to the hectic and fast paced nature of trials, certain objectionable
occurrences may slip by counsel undetected. When this situation occurs,
and counsel realizes too late that an objection should have been raised, an
objection may still be entertained by the court and should be raised as early
16. Beavers, 427 S.E.2d at 418-19 (citing Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 793).
17. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
18. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 606-07, 616-17 (Va. 1999).
19. Id. at 611; see VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-10 (providing the punishment for conviction
of a felony), 18.2-31 (defining capital murder and the class of felony if convicted); 53.1-165.1
(mandating parole ineligibility for persons convicted of a felony offense occurring on or after
January 1, 1995), 53.1-40.01 (stating that geriatric parole is not available to those convicted
of a class 1 felony committed on or after January 1, 1995) (Michie 1999).
20. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 606-07.
21. The Supreme Court of Virginia did not mention procedural default regarding
Yarbrough's argument surrounding the "life means life" jury instruction. A very careful
reading of Yarbrough's Supreme Court of Virginia brief and the record might have led the
Supreme Court of Virginia to rule that Yarbrough's "life means life" instruction was proce-
durally defaulted because counsel's stated grounds for objection were not identical to the
grounds which the court ultimately relied upon to vacate Yarbrough's sentence. Brief for
Appellant at 15-16, Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d 602 (Nos. 990261, 990262); Record at 1212-13,
1253, 1262-63, 1282-83, Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d 602 (Nos. 990261, 990262).
22. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 617.
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as possible.23 Accordingly, counsel should request to approach the bench
and register the objection when the objectionable behavior is realized.24 If
the court rules on counsel's objection at that time, the court has in essence
validated counsel's objection by implying that it was fully informed as to the
objection and was able to make an intelligent ruling.2" In that event, the
trial has not been obstructed, both parties have had an opportunity to
register an argument at side bar, and all the bases of the contemporaneous
objection rule have been satisfied; there should be no default.
B. Properly Preserved Issue Not Raised on Direct Appeal
All properly preserved issues must be raised on direct appeal in order
to preserve them for later review during both state and federal post-convic-
tion proceedings.26 At the federal level, defendants will be limited to argu-
ments which were made at the state level.27 Virginia attorneys face an
additional problem when contemplating appellate issues in capital cases: the
fifty-page limit on appeal briefs imposed by Rule 5:26 of the Rules of Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.28 This may not sound like an imposing limitation,
23. See generally Natman Schaye, Winning at Trial by Preparing to Lose: Creating the
Record on Appeal, CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 10, 57. It is important to stress that many of the
cases which provide for procedural default when an issue has not been objected to and raised
at the trial level focus on the fact that the issue was raised for the first time at the appellate
level. See Varner's Ex'rs v. White, 140 S.E. 128, 131 (Va. 1927); Southern Ry. v. Cohen
Weenen & Co., 157 S.E. 563, 565 (Va. 1931); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 278
(Va. 1983). Therefore, if counsel can object in a "timely" manner by bringing the issue to the
court's attention as early as possible after the offending occurrence transpired, and the court
gives counsel a ruling on the objection, it will be difficult for a reviewing court to claim that
the matter was not raised and ruled on at the trial level, even if the objection did not immedi-
ately follow the perceived error. When bringing a tardy objection, counsel may also rely on
Simmons v. Commonwealth, which held that counsel may object to the presentation of
evidence at a time after it is first introduced if the inadmissability and objectionable nature
of the evidence was not readily apparent at the time it was first offered. 371 S.E.2d 7, 10 (Va.
Ct. App. 1988).
24. Schaye, supra note 23, at 57.
25. See Woodson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.E.2d 818 (Va. 1970) (holding that failure to
provide reason for original objection and subsequent lack of ruling thereon by the trial court
resulted in failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule).
26. See Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va.
1974). Certain issues may be raised for the first time during state post-conviction proceed-
ings. Habeas counsel must raise these issues in accordance with state post-conviction
procedural rules.
27. See Whitely v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1499-1505 (4th Cir. 1986).
28. VA. S. CT. R. 5:26. Upon request, permission may be granted by a Supreme Court
of Virginia Justice to file a longer brief. Id. The reality is that the granting of permission to
extend a brief beyond fifty pages has never been noted in a published decision. In Weeks v.
Angelone counsel for Weeks submitted a ninety-page brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia
and moved that body to make exception to the page limit as provided under Rule 5:26. 176
F.3d 249, 270 (4th Cir. 1999). The request was denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id.
20001
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
but it frequently forces counsel to pick and choose among appellate issues,
causing assignments of error to be abandoned. 9 Obviously, such decisions
can have deadly ramifications.
C Relying on a Different Legal Basis Wen Asserting Properly
Preserved Issues on Appeal
When counsel objects to an error or files a motion during pre-trial or
trial, counsel must object on all possible grounds. When assigning errors for
post-trial review, counsel must rely on the same reason(s) for which counsel
originally made the objection. If a new legal basis is used when arguing an
assigned error, regardless of the propriety of that legal basis, a reviewing
court has the discretion to determine the error procedurally defaulted or
waived. In Goins v. Commonwealth,m" defense counsel made an objection at
trial based on an inability effectively to cross-examine a witness. 1 On
appeal counsel switched grounds for the error, arguing that the testimony
proffered was irrelevant and uejudicial." The Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to consider the error.
The United States Supreme Court has held that if a defendant did not
cite federal grounds when assigning error at the state level, a federal court
will not review the claim.'4 If the defendant only assigned one of many
possible federal grounds for a particular error at state proceedings, he will
only be allowed to argue that particular ground in federal court.3' There-
at 270-71. The Fourth Circuit found that counsel's failure to brief all forty~seven claims of
error due to Rule 5:26 required all issues not addressed properly below to be procedurally
defaulted. Id. at 270-72. Weeks was executed March 16, 2000. Frank Green, Weeks Dies By
Injection Final Words AreApology to Victim's Family, Others, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 17, 2000, at B1.
29. Weeks, 176 F.3d at 270-71. Weeks abandoned ten claims of federal constitutional
error, thereby causing them to be defaulted. Id. at 271. Due to the ever changing face of
capital law in the United States, it is impossible to determine what issues will be successful,
even if they have been determined to be without merit at the state and lower federal court
levels. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
30. 470 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1996).
31. Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 128 (Va. 1996).
32. Id. at 128.
33. Id.
34. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1982). In Anderson the defendant cited a
case decided on state constitutional grounds when assigning error during the appellate
process. A federal court of appeals, affirming a writ of habeas corpus, based its decision on
the federal due process aspects of that case. The United States Supreme Court held that no
federal argument had been presented or relied on by petitioner at the state proceedings, and
therefore, the federal court should not have reviewed the claim. Id. at 7-8; see also Gray v.
Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1996).
35. See Washington v. Downes, 475 F. Supp. 573, 576-77 (E.D. Va. 1979); Carrier v.
Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1983).
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fore, it is imperative that defense counsel assert all possible legal claims at the
time of the objection and in any motion and accompanying memorandum.
Counsel should assign error based on the United States Constitution, the
Virginia Constitution, and Virginia state law, including statutes, rules and
case law. 6
D. Relying on a Different Factual Basis When Asserting a
Properly Preserved Claim
A reviewing court, be it state or federal, may determine that a claim is
procedurally defaulted if counsel relies on a different set of facts when
raising an issue on appeal than was used as the basis of his objection or
motion at the trial stage. All of the facts upon which counsel intends to rely
on appeal must be presented and argued at the trial level. To provide an
example, when assigning error to a prosecutor's opening argument, counsel
may only assign error to the portion of the argument that counsel actually
objected to, even if, upon reflection, other parts of the opening also consti-
tuted error."
Additionally, even though all facts are in the record, counsel must
ground his appellate issues on the same facts which were the basis of trial
objections. Moreover, counsel's brief must actually present the factual
grounds relied upon in order to avoid procedural default. Counsel may not
"incorporate" the record into his appellate brief by referring to the record,
in order to save space, when assigning and briefing errors.38
E. Failure to Assign Error to Claims Which Have Not Yet Been Successful
United States Supreme Court precedent requires counsel to raise a
constitutional issue in order to preserve that issue. This is so even if the
issue has been decided in a manner unfavorable to the defendant in state or
federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court. 9 The Court has
held that "[w]here the basis of a constitutional claim is available, and other
36. Bright, supra note 12, at 45.
37. Id. Historically counsel would not interrupt opening or closing arguments, but
instead voice any objections to those arguments when opposing counsel had finished the
entire argument. Today, waiting until the end of opposing counsel's o pening or closing
argument to object to a statement made during the argument will trigger the contemporane-
ous objection rule found in Rule 5:25 and the objection will fail. See Russo v. Common-
wealth, 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Va. 1966). For an analysis of the lack of civility in modern day
Virginia courtrooms, see Ashley Flynn, Procedural Default" A DeFacto Exception to Civility?,
12 CAP. DEF. J., 289 (2000).
38. See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360,370 (Va. 1992) (holding that brief's
citation to fifteen pages of trial transcript referring to argument that counsel made regarding
an objection at trial was insufficient for purposes of preserving the error on appeal); see also
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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defense counsel have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of
comity and finality counsel against labeling alleged unawareness of the
objection as cause for a procedural default."' Therefore, when a federal
constitutional claim is in the process of being litigated by other attorneys,
even in other states, "counsel is charged with knowledge that the 'tools to
construct a constitutional claim' exist and [counsel] is expected to raise the
issue no matter how futile it may be in the court considering the defendant's
case."
41
This form of procedural default has occurred multiple times in Virginia.
In Smith v. Murray,42 counsel failed to raise a constitutional claim because
the Supreme Court of Virginia had previously ruled that the claim was
without merit.43 However, the same claim, presented in Texas, was held to
have merit by the United States Supreme Court." The United States
Supreme Court held Smith's claim to have been procedurally defaulted
because of his failure to present the claim for review to the Supreme Court
of Virginia.4" Smith was executed."
An example in which defense counsel acted properly, preserving an
issue that had not been treated favorably at either the state or federal level,
occurred in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth. In Yarbrough, defense counsel
proffered a parole ineligibility instruction and then objected when the trial
court failed to instruct the jury regarding defendant's parole ineligibility. 4
This objection, briefed for appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, was
recorded and preserved even though adverse Virginia case law existed and
a fair reading of United States Supreme Court case law also suggested that
the claim was without merit.4" Instead of relying on the cases cited by each
side,49 the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled the issue had merit based on
40. Id. at 134.
41. Bright, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting Engle v. Issacs, 456 U.S. 107, 133 (1982)).
42. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
43. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 531 (1986). When determining what errors to brief
for appeal, counsel commonly abandons those errors which the Supreme Court of Virginia
has previously considered and denied due to the fifty-page limitation placed on appellate
briefs by Rule 5:26. See supra note 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
44. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
45. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533-38.
46. Vristnam Vet is Executed in Virginia, An. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at A4.
47. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 606 (Va. 1999).
48. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding where future danger-
ousness is at issue and state law prohibits parole if defendant is sentenced to life in prison, due
process requires that the jury be informed that the only alternative to death sentence is life
imprisonment without parole); Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98, 111 (Va. 1996)
(holding that a defendant is only eligible for a "life means life" instruction when the defen-
dant's future dangerousness is at issue and the defendant is ineligible for parole at the time he
is sentenced on the capital murder charge).
49. Both the Commonwealth and Yarbrough relied on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
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Virginia case law and vacated Yarbrough's sentence.'s Defense counsel in
Yarbrougb masterfully identified a questionable claim, preserved the claim
and required the Supreme Court of Virginia to review and rule on the claim.
Counsel are urged to object, preserve and brief all colorable claims,
regardless of current adverse Virginia precedent and questionable United
States Supreme Court precedent. Only in the case where an issue has been
clearly resolved by the United States Supreme Court should counsel not
object, preserve and brief that issue.."
111. Making the Record and Preserving Errors for Review
While it is imperative for defense counsel to have a comprehensive
understanding of the procedural requirements involved in making the
record and correctly preserving all possible objections for appeal and habeas
proceedings, it is equally important that counsel have a complete under-
standing of the legal basis for an appeal. It is imperative that counsel rely
heavily on federal constitutional grounds when making all objections and
motions at trial and assigning errors at appellate and habeas proceedings.
This is especially true in Virginia, where state court relief at the direct appeal
level and during habeas proceedings is rare for a convicted capital murderer.
Familiarity with United States Supreme Court capital case law is a must for
capital defense counsel.5 2 It is also important for counsel to be aware of "any
arguably applicable provisions of the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the decisions of the... lower courts, the state constitution, state
statutes, state rules and state case law."53
A court, state or federal, reviewing a habeas petition will only review
issues which were raised at trial and on direct appeal.' In addition, federal
U.S. 154 (1994), which held that, under certain circumstances, a convicted capital murderer
was entitled to a "life means life" instruction. Appellant's brief citedJones v. Commonwealth,
72 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1952), one of the three Virginia cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia
relied upon in vacating Yarbrough's sentence. Brief for Appellant at 16, Yarbrough, 519
S.E.2d 602 (Nos. 990261, 990262). In addition to Simmons, the Commonwealth relied on
Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98 (Va. 1996), a Virginia case which followed Simmons,
limiting its application to those trials which were circumstantially similar. Yarbrough, 519
S.E.2d at 611-12.
50. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 613-18.
51. Bright, supra note 12, at 44. This is true unless counsel believes a new argument or
court majority might yield a positive result.
52. A listing of all significant United States capital cases with a brief description of their
importance to defending a capital charge has been compiled by the Southern Center for
Human Rights. The compilation can be viewed and printed from the Southern Center for
Human Rights web page. The URL is http://www.schr.org/death-penalty-info/index.html.
53. Bright, supra note 12, at 44.
54. See Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974). Slayton has been cited by
both state and federal courts for the proposition that a claim will not be reviewed if it was
not first raised at trial and again on direct appeal. See Mu'min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 194 (4th
20001
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courts will only review federal constitutional claims which have first been
presented to and rejected by Virginia state courts." Presenting only state
law as the basis of one's arguments will bar federal constitutional claims
from review in the federal courts.' Counsel should always utilize the
United States Constitution and cases interpreting the Constitution when
formulating arguments in support of counsel's position at trial and on direct
appeal.
57
Having been warned that the Supreme Court of Virginia rarely pro-
vides relief to capital petitioners, counsel should still preserve all issues on
every applicable state law ground. An error which occurred pre-trial or at
trial may be correctable only through state law means." In addition, the
Supreme Court of Virginia may interpret the Virginia Constitution more
broadly then its federal counterpart.
A recent example of the Supreme Court of Virginia applying Virginia
case law in a more expansive fashion than required by the federal constitu-
tion occurred in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth. In Yarbrough the Common-
wealth argued that the defendant was not eligible for a "life means life"
instruction because the Commonwealth was not seeking a death sentence
based on the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but only on the
vileness aggravating factor.' The Commonwealth relied on Simmons v.
South Carolina, a United States Supreme Court case which held that a capital
defendant was entitled to a "life means life" instruction when convicted of
capital murder and a death sentence based on the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness was sought.6 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the
Commonwealth's argument and based its decision to grant Yarbrough a
new sentencing proceeding on Virginia case law dating back as far as 1935.62
Cir. 1997); Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648, 651 (Va. 1995).
55. See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983).
56. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1982).
57. Bright, supra note 12, at 44.
58. Id.; see also Schaye, supra note 23, at 14.
59. Bright, supra note 12, at 44; see also Schaye, supra note 23, at 14 ("As the federal
courts have become more Draconian, state appellate judges have shown a willingness to find
relief under state constitutions.").
60. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 611 (Va. 1999).
61. Id. at 611; see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994).
62. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 613-16. It is important to note that the Supreme Court
of Virginia did not base its ruling in Yarbrough upon the defendant's exact grounds for
appealing the trial court's failure to proffer the "life means life" instruction to the jury. Id.;
see supra note 21. To say this is odd or rare is an understatement. How many otherwise valid
claims have been rejected or ignored based on a faulty or incomplete legal basis is impossible
to determine. Counsel should take from this example the need for diligence, creativity and
research in preparing for a capital case, as well as note the lengths required to make the record
and preserve error in order to provide a defendant with the opportunity for relief at a post-
trial proceeding.
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A. Object
In preparation for trial, counsel should attempt to predict what stan-
dard and particular objections may be required in the specific case being
tried.63 Having thus predicted, counsel should prepare complete objections,
including all state and federal grounds for each objection. Since it is impossi-
ble to predict every move that a prosecutor will make during trial, counsel
should be prepared to object when instinct prompts such a reflex, even
before precise grounds for the objection are apparent. As the reason for
objecting crystalizes it should be stated, along with all possible state and
federal grounds which could support the objection.'
The case of Benjamin Lee Lilly, recently reversed and remanded by the
United States Supreme Court, provides an excellent example of an objection
made and supported on both state and federal grounds.6 During Lilly's trial
the Commonwealth called Mark Lilly, the brother and co-defendant of
Benjamin Lilly, as a witness." Mark Lilly, invoking the Fifth Amendment,
refused to testify.6 The Commonwealth then offered a statement made by
Mark Lilly during initial post-arrest questioning, in which he admitted to
participation in the crime and stated that Benjamin Lilly committed the
Virginia state law is more expansive than federal constitutional law requires in at least
two other areas pertinent to Virginia death penalty law. First, section 18.2-18 of the Virginia
Code prohibits all but the actual perpetrator of the killing from receiving the death penalty.
VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999) (excepting murder for hire or by direction). In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held that an accomplice who intends for a
killing to occur or for deadly force to be used during the commission of a crime, who
participates in a major way in a felony that results in a murder, or whose mental state is one
of reckless indifference may receive the death penalty. See Enniund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
799-800 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,157 (1987). Therefore, the Virginia legislature
has limited the number of death penalty eligible defendants compared to the Eighth Amend-
ment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Second, Virginia's death penalty scheme provides those convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death with a mandatory proportionality review conducted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1999). This proportionality review,
while conducted in a questionable manner due to the Supreme Court of Virginia's failure in
most cases to review a capital conviction resulting in a death sentence with capital convictions
which did not result in a death sentence, is not required by the United States Constitution.
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-51 (1984) (holding that proportionality review is not
constitutionally required where state death penalty scheme does not provide for such review);
see also, Kelly E. P. Bennett, Proportionality Review: The Historical Application and Deficien-
cies, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 103 (1999). Therefore, the Virginia proportionality review requirement
also exceeds the rights provided by the federal constitution.
63. See generally Schaye, supra note 23, at 57.
64. Id.
65. See Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1901 (1999).
66. Id. at 1892.
67. Id. at 1892-93.
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murder.6" Defense counsel initially attempted to suppress Mark Lilly's
statement pre-trial and at trial repeated the objection to this evidence when
it was proffered by the Commonwealth.69 In both the pre-trial suppression
motion and when objecting to the statement at trial, Lilly's counsel relied
on both state and federal grounds: (1) Mark Lilly's statement did not fall
within accepted state hearsay exceptions and (2) the admission of the co-
defendant's statements violated Benjamin Lilly's Sixth Amendment Right
to Confrontation.'0 By stating both state and federal grounds, defense
counsel provided the Supreme Court of Virginia the opportunity to reverse
the trial court's ruling without having to rely on federal constitutional
grounds, while at the same time providing the United States Supreme Court
with the means to reverse the state trial court should Virginia's highest court
fail to reverse clear error.
B. Raise All Issues
Defending a capital charge requires defense counsel to be on the cutting
edge of the law, informed and knowledgeable of both well settled case law
and new developments in capital practice." Allowing an objectionable
circumstance or occurrence to slip by and failing to anticipate new develop-
ments regarding capital law have resulted in the loss of meritorious claims
and the premature death of multiple Virginia capital defendants."2 In trying
to anticipate new developments in capital law, counsel should be prepared
to object to anything that seems unfair or unjust. 3 Objections of this nature
will often rely on constitutional principles recognized by the United States
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Virginia which have not been
applied to the particular circumstance confronted by defense counsel.7 4
To return to a familiar example, defense counsel in Yarbrough v.
Commonwealth objected to the trial court's failure to provide the jury with
an instruction that "life means life.""5 In doing this, counsel relied on the
federal constitutional due process holding in Simmons v. South Carolina,
which requires the instruction to be given when (1) the prosecution bases its
request for the death penalty on the aggravating factor of future dangerous-
68. Id.
69. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 527, 533-34 (Va. 1998).
70. id.
71. Bright, supra note 12, at 44; see also supra note 52.
72. See Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1986) (holding that if a daim was
available to a defendant prior to affirmance of his conviction and sentence on direct appeal
and defendant failed to raise the claim until habeas proceedings, that claim will be procedur-
ally defaulted); see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
73. Bright, supra note 12, at 44.
74. Id.
75. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 606-07 (Va. 1999).
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ness and (2) there is no possibility for parole should the defendant receive
a life sentence. 6 Yarbrough was sentenced to death under the aggravating
factor of vileness alone.' Still, defense counsel based its objection on the
constitutional principles found in Simmons.'8 The Supreme Court of
Virginia vacated Yarbrough's death sentence." While the court did not
utilize defense counsel's specific argument in vacating Yarbrough's death
sentence, it did state that its holding would be consistent with a fair trial for
both sides.8" Yarbrough's counsel laid the groundwork enabling
Yarbrough's death sentence to be vacated by objecting and briefing the issue
on the grounds of a recognized constitutional principle not yet applied to
the particular facts which counsel was presented with at trial.81
C. Assert All State and Federal Grounds
It is imperative that trial counsel state all appropriate grounds, both
state and federal, in support of all objections and motions made during the
pre-trial and trial phases. Should counsel make a bona fide objection at trial,
stating certain grounds upon which the objection is based, the objection will
not be preserved on other unstated grounds.82 In addition, federal courts
will not review assignments of error that relied exclusively on state
grounds.8 3
During the course of a trial counsel may realize that additional grounds
should have been assigned to an earlier objection. When this occurs,
counsel should make a point of assigning the extra grounds to that
objection. This can be done by renewing the objection and stating for the
record the additional grounds for the objection!4 As long as the trial court
has an opportunity to take corrective action (for example, the renewed
objection is made before the case has been sent to the jury), counsel should
be permitted to clarify and enrich a prior objection, which was overruled,
by utilizing this process.85
76. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994).
77. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 606.
78. Id. at 611.
79. Id. at 617.
80. Id. at 616.
81. Id. at 611. Not only had the constitutional due process principle not been applied
to the circumstances Yarbrough encountered, but in fact existing precedent suggested that the
constitutional principle defense counsel relied upon had been rejected by the Supreme Court
of Virginia. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
82. See Washington v. Downes, 475 F. Supp. 573, 576-77 (E.D. Va. 1979). But see supra
note 21.
83. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982).




In the heat of trial counsel may not always identify all plausible
grounds when making objections. One creative method for avoiding failure
to preserve all legal grounds when making objections at trial is to prepare a
trial memorandum which incorporates a long list of constitutional
provisions and cases and states that all objections made during trial are based
on the grounds found within the trial memorandum. s6 Having filed the
memorandum, counsel can simply refer to the trial memorandum when
making an objection at trial and ask that the objection be based on all
grounds found within the memorandum. 7 In addition, trial counsel may
cite particular federal and state grounds, but the trial memorandum will
cover all grounds which may be common or alternatively not readily
apparent.
D. Create a Factual Basis for Relief in the Record
The record must demonstrate clearly the occurrence and facts which
counsel cites and relies upon when assigning error for appellate review."8
This is especially pertinent when there may be more then one legitimate
ground on which to base an objection. In such a circumstance, counsel will
be provided with certain facts upon which to object, but there may also be
alternate reasons for the objection of which counsel is aware but which have
not yet been established and recorded. At this point counsel must present
the alternate facts and record a second objection based on those facts,
providing another legitimate ground for the objection.'
In Myers v. Commonwealth,' defense counsel contested the validity of
one entry on a certified transcript of conviction.91 On appeal, counsel
argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication.'
The Virginia Court of Appeals refused to consider the appellant's claim
"because the abstract was not received into evidence."93 Myers's claim was
procedurally defaulted because defense counsel failed to establish a proper
record by having the transcript of conviction entered into evidence. 94
E. Make the Record Reflect All Objections




90. No. 0778-87-4, 1989 WL 641940 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 1989).







Depending on the presiding judge, counsel will either have a relatively
easy time establishing a record of the proceedings or will have to make a
very deliberate and conscious effort to make the best record possible. It is
imperative that counsel make all objections on the record and file all
motions, proposed jury instructions, and other relevant material so that
these materials will be part of the record.9" Counsel should also keep in
mind that the record needs to be clear with respect to both critical facts and
the bases for all objections, motions and denied requests.96
Special consideration should be given to court proceedings which are
commonly left out of the record. Such proceedings include those in
chambers, bench conferences, and arguments between counsel.9" Court
reporters frequently do not record bench conferences or proceedings in
chambers. Defense counsel has the right, under most circumstances, to have
a court reporter present during in camera proceedings." If these proceedings
are not recorded by the court reporter, they will not be in the record and,
consequently, will be unavailable for review at a post-trial proceeding.
During trial, counsel should make objections and motions at side-bar,
"out of the presence of the jury."" Should the judge refuse to hear all
objections at side-bar, counsel should object to this ruling on Sixth
Amendment fair trial and effective assistance of counsel grounds. " Judges
may be unwilling to alter their trial habits even though counsel is defending
a capital case and the United States Supreme Court has stated that capital
cases require a heightened standard of reliability.'' Still, counsel should
make every effort to have the right to object out of the jury's hearing.
95. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
96. Id. A good imagination may be necessary in determining what might be a relevant
fact necessary for preservation. In addition to the substantive matters of a capital trial,
counsel should also consider any collateral circumstances associated with the trial, such as the
resence of uniformed officers, the emotional reactions of the audience, or improper juror
behavior. See Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that ictures,
included in the record at request of defense counsel, of an overwhelming number of
uniformed prison guards in the courtroom evidenced prejudice requiring death sentence to
be overturned). These and other objectionable actions during trial should be memorialized
in the record via photographs, affidavits, testimony of witnesses called for such purpose, or
any other means available to counsel for making the record. See generally Bright, supra note
12, at 46. While there may be tactical reasons not to enter certain exhibits into the record,
counsel should balance these concerns with that of providing reviewing courts with as
complete a record as possible in the hopes of securing reversal on appeal. See Schaye, supra
note 23, at 57.
97. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
98. See Brittingham v. Commonwealth, 394 S.E.2d 336 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
99. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
100. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
101. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a term of imprisonment and requires a corresponding
need of reliability when determining that death is the appropriate penalty in a specific case).
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Regardless of a judge's reluctance to allow counsel to make the record,
counsel must ensure that the record is as complete, accurate and clear as
possible. Objections and motions for a mistrial must be made
contemporaneously with all prejudicial conduct.'02 When required to make
legal arguments in the presence of the jury, counsel should supplement the
objection or motion the next time the jury is excused, "pointing out the
impossibility of curing the objectionable matter because of the court's
unwillingness to hear the argument in a timely manner."' 3 If a judge goes
even further, refusing to allow counsel to state an objection or the grounds
for an objection, counsel must make sure the record reflects this denial, by
requesting to be heard on the objection."° Again, at the first opportunity,
after the jury has been excused, counsel should supplement the argument,
asking for a mistrial or reconsideration.' 5 If this fails, counsel should make
all objections to the court reporter at the end of the session, stating when
and how counsel attempted to make the record earlier in the day, what the
judge did to prevent such recording, the nature of the objection or motion,
what remedy was sought, and how the defendant was consequently
prejudiced."° Finally, when counsel is denied access to the court reporter
at the end of the day, counsel should address all concerns in writing, stating
all possible grounds, and file such document with the clerk of the court.0 7
F. Askfor All Potential Remedies
Counsel are required to ask for a remedy when making an objection
during trial; if counsel fails to request a remedy, the claim will be
procedurally defaulted." 8 Asking for a remedy goes beyond simply
requesting for the record what defense counsel deems an appropriate
recourse for a particular infraction. Counsel should be prepared to request
a remedy and offer support for the need for that specific remedy. Generally,
counsel should ask for a mistrial when an error has occurred during a capital
102. See Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 140-41 (Va. 1995); Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (Va. 1990); Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682
(Va. 1974).
103. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Schaye, supra note 23, at 12.
107. Id.; see also Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
108. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 414 S.E.2d 859 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
where defense counsel fails to ask for a cautionary instruction or mistrial, prosecutor's
improper comments or conduct will not be considered on a ppeal). But see Martinez v.
Commonwealth, 395 S.E.2d 467 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that defense counsel was not
required to request cautionary instruction or mistrial after the trial judge overruled an
objection to the Commonwealth Attorney's dosing argument).
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trial.1" Further, counsel should be prepared to argue why anything less
than a mistrial would be inadequate."' In Breard v. Commonwealth,1
defense counsel requested a mistrial in regard to a witness's testimony, but
the motion for a mistrial came after four other witnesses had subsequently
testified.11 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia deemed the claim and any
possible remedy waived by counsel's failure to raise an objection and request
a remedy in a timely manner, pursuant to Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the
Virginia Supreme Court."' Angel Breard was executed on April 14, 1998.114
While asking for a mistrial should be the standard remedy sought when
making objections at a capital trial, counsel must also ask for additional
remedies in the alternative. Failure to ask for all possible remedies has been
held to constitute a waiver of the issue.
Gray v. Netherland1 provides an example of a reviewing court holding
an issue procedurally defaulted because counsel failed to ask for the proper
remedy, thereby prohibiting a proper disposition of the issue at trial. 116 The
prosecutor in Gray informed the defense before trial that, should Gray be
found guilty of capital murder, the Commonwealth would introduce
evidence at the sentencing phase regarding Gray's participation in an
unsolved murder, but that this evidence would be limited to statements
made by Gray.117 Upon Gray's conviction, the prosecutor informed defense
counsel that the Commonwealth intended to introduce evidence, in addition
to Gray's statements, connecting Gray to the unsolved murder.1 Defense
counsel objected on due process grounds, stating that the new evidence took
him by surprise and that he was not provided with sufficient notice, and
asked that the newly revealed evidence be excluded. 9 While stating that
counsel was not prepared at this time to rebut the additional evidence,
109. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
110. Id. Judges will deny most mistrial requests and instead offer a curative instruction
requesting the jury to disregard the offensive conduct. This remedy is often inadequate in
addressing the objection. Counsel must renew the objection and mistrial request, citing the
inadequacy of the court's remedial action. Id.
111. 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
112. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 678 (Va. 1994).
113. Id.; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
114. Virginia Executes Paraguayanfor Murder Amid Controversy, Debate, CHIG. TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1998, at 13.
115. 518 U.S. 152 (1996).
116. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996).
117. Id. at 156-57.
118. Id. at 157. This additional evidence included photographs of the crime scene and
testimony by police investigators and the state medical examiner that was intended to
illustrate that the manner in which the victims of the unsolved murder were killed was
similar to that of the victim for whose murder Gray had just been convicted. Id.
119. Id. at 157, 161-62.
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defense counsel failed specifically to ask for a continuance. 2 This failure
was noted by the United States Supreme Court.' The Court stated that
exclusion of evidence was not the only possible remedy, and that counsel's
failure affirmatively to ask for a continuance could have been interpreted by
the trial court as a tactical decision.2 In the end, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that part of Gray's claim was procedurally defaulted and re-
manded what remained for a determination by the Fourth Circuit.' The
Fourth Circuit held that Gray had procedurally defaulted what remained of
the claim.'24 Had defense counsel requested a continuance in the alternative
to exclusion of the evidence, and the trial court still denied counsel's mo-
tion, Gray's.death sentence may have been vacated due to the prosecutor's
failure to provide proper notice regarding sentencing phase evidence. Gray
was executed on February 26, 1997.12
G. Require the Court to Make a Ruling
An important function of the contemporaneous objection rule is to
allow the trial court to rule on any objections presented by counsel in an
intelligent and informed manner at the time of the objectionable conduct.
2 6
Without a ruling, a reviewing court may assume that counsel either failed
to raise an objection at trial regarding the claim brought before the review-
ing court, failed to state the proper grounds for the objection at trial, or
failed to ask for a proper remedy at the time of the objection. If the trial
court did not rule on an objection, for the reasons listed above or any other
reason, the objection will not be preserved for appellate review.
2 7
There are several reasons why a judge may not provide a ruling when
defense counsel makes an objection. Often a judge will attempt to reach
consensus among opposing parties on an issue instead of dealing with an
120. Id. at 157.
121. Id. at 169.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 170-71.
124. Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 166 (4th Cir. 1996). For a more comprehensive
analysis of Gray's appellate holdings, see Flynn, supra note 37.
125. See Laura Lafay & Robert Little, Coleman Gray Put to Death by Injection,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
126. See Woodson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Va. 1970); Simmons v.
Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 7, 10 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); see also supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
127. See Woodson, 176 S.E.2d at 820-21; Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d
36, 38-39 (Va. 1995) (holding that when trial court was never afforded the opportunity to
address and rule on an issue the reviewing court will not hear that issue on appeal). But see
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E.2d 885 (Va. Ct. A pp. 1992) (holding that counsel who
raised objection three times and did all that was requiredto preserve issue did not waive the
claim by failing to insist that the trial judge rule on the motion).
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objection in a standard fashion."' Sometimes a judge may attempt to coerce
counsel into acquiescing with the judge's interpretation of the proper
resolution regarding objectionable conduct.1 29 Occasionally a judge might
fail to provide a ruling in an attempt to deny appellate review of a legitimate
error. 3 Whatever the reason for a judge's reluctance to issue a ruling when
counsel objects at trial, counsel must insist on a ruling and make objections
and exceptions to all adverse rulings on the record.
IV Conclusion
Defending a capital murder charge in Virginia requires counsel to be
both a trial advocate, effectively preparing for and conducting a capital trial,
and an appellate lawyer, mindful of the objection and record preservation
requirements necessitated by the Supreme Court of Virginia's and federal
courts' exacting procedural default rules. A Virginia capital trial, complete
with a death qualified jury, is often not the most favorable venue for a
capital defendant. Ensuring that a capital defendant has the advantage of
presenting all possible errors that occur during the defendant's trial in post-
conviction proceedings is an important role of capital trial counsel.
128. Bright, supra note 12, at 46.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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